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 Long-term growth forecasts and stock recommendation profitability 
   
 
Abstract 
We investigate whether analysts’ long-term growth (LTG) forecasts are a signal of 
analyst effort, which is reflected in the long-term profitability of their stock 
recommendations. We develop a one-year-ahead LTG forecast likelihood score and 
execute a trading strategy that generates average abnormal returns of 2.9% per annum 
over our sample period (1995-2005). Furthermore, in out-of-sample testing during the 
2006-2011 period our trading strategy, without portfolio rebalancing, earns abnormal 
returns of 2.5% per annum. In summary, this study illustrates previously 
undocumented long-term benefits accruing to investors from the information inherent 
in analyst LTG forecasts.  
 
Keywords: Analyst forecasts, long-term earnings growth, stock recommendations, 
trading strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate whether long-term growth (LTG) forecasts are a valid signal of effective 
analyst effort to gain a more value-relevant perspective of the long-term prospects of the 
firms they follow. We hypothesize that, if so, this analyst effort should also be reflected in 
their other outputs, including the long-term profitability of their stock recommendations. We 
find results consistent with our expectations, thereby identifying previously undocumented 
benefits available to investors from the information inherent in analyst LTG forecasts. 
 Prior research on analyst long-term growth forecasts has produced a puzzling result – 
many analysts issue LTG forecasts, but these forecasts seem to have no investment value. 
Specifically, prior literature provides evidence that, on average, analyst LTG forecasts are 
optimistically biased, inaccurate and are negatively related to future abnormal returns (La 
Porta, 1996; Dechow and Sloan, 1997; Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Harris, 1999; Chan et al., 
2003; Szakmary et al., 2008). One proposed explanation for these findings is that because 
analysts are not generally evaluated on the accuracy of their LTG forecasts, they reflect 
analysts’ opportunistic incentives to stimulate investment banking business, generate trading 
commissions and gain access to managers’ private information (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; 
Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dechow et al., 2000; Cowen et al., 2003). Yet, recent regulatory 
changes have restricted analysts’ ability to benefit from these activities (Regulation FD, 
NASD Rule 2711, and NYSE Rule 472) and analysts continue to issue LTG forecasts.  
An alternative explanation is that the issuance of LTG forecasts is a signal of analyst 
effort. Prior studies indicate that while analysts have a short-term incentive to optimistically 
bias forecasts and recommendations, they also have a long-term incentive to build their own 
reputation through high-quality forecasts and recommendations (Hayes, 1998; Hong and 
Kubik, 2003; Irvine, 2001; Jackson, 2005). We propose that through the process of LTG 
forecasting analysts expend greater effort to understand the company and its future prospects 
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(relative to analysts that don’t forecast LTG). If the issuance of LTG forecasts is a signal of 
greater effort, this greater effort should also be reflected in the quality of analysts’ other 
outputs, such as the profitability of their stock recommendations.
1
 
Our approach is similar to that used in recent work by Call et al. (2013), who argue 
that when analysts forecast cash flows (in addition to earnings), they adopt a more structured 
approach to forecasting, which results in better quality short-term earnings forecasts. 
Recently, Jung et al. (2012) also provide evidence consistent with analysts which forecast 
LTG expending more effort in their forecasting. Specifically, they find that stock 
recommendations accompanied by LTG forecasts are more informative to investors and 
analysts that issue LTG forecasts have more favourable career outcomes.  
We extend prior research by investigating analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics 
that are related to LTG forecast issuance and whether it is possible for investors to earn 
abnormal returns by trading on the signal imbedded in LTG forecast issuance. Specifically, 
we contribute new empirical evidence on whether investors can use analyst and firm 
characteristics ex ante to predict the likelihood of future LTG issuance and then use these 
predictions to execute a long-term trading strategy, based on analyst stock recommendations, 
that earns abnormal returns.
2
   
Our empirical analysis consists of two steps. First, using financial analysts’ LTG 
forecasts from I/B/E/S for a large cross-section of U.S. companies from 1994 through 2005, 
                                                 
1 LTG is an important input when calculating stock prices and formulating stock recommendations (Ohlson, 
1995, Bradshaw, 2004).  
2 Prior studies indicate that trading strategies based on the stock recommendations of all analysts provide mixed 
results (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001, 2003; Bradshaw, 2004; Barniv et al., 2009). This is 
not surprising as analysts differ in their forecasting ability and the incentives they face (Mikhail et al., 1997; 
Clement, 1999; Jackson, 2005). Loh and Mian (2006), for example, document a contemporaneous relation 
between individual analyst one-year-ahead earnings forecasting ability and the profitability of stock 
recommendations. Hall and Tacon (2010), however, find minimal evidence of a predictive relation between 
one-year-ahead earnings forecast ability and recommendation profitability. Moreover, individual analysts’ 
incentives such as independence of the brokerage (Barber et al., 2007); the change in regulation environment, 
i.e. Regulation FD, NASD Rule 2711, and NYSE Rule 472, (Barniv et al., 2009; Chen and Chen, 2009) and the 
trade-off between building a reputation vs. generating trade (Simon and Curtis, 2011) have influenced the 
relation between analysts’ stock recommendations and security returns.  
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we use a logit model to compute a “LTG likelihood score” that summarizes the likelihood of 
a one-year-ahead LTG forecast issuance for each analyst-firm-year (for similar methodology, 
see Cremers et al., 2009).
3 This predicted LTG likelihood score uses five analyst 
characteristics, two brokerage characteristics and four firm characteristics that prior research 
has identified as useful signals of the likelihood that analysts will issue LTG forecasts for 
particular firms. The results of this analysis confirm that LTG issuance is positively related 
to analyst characteristics expected to be related to analyst effort - short-term earnings 
forecasting accuracy, experience and access to value relevant information.  
In our second step we evaluate whether LTG forecast likelihood is associated with 
stock recommendation profitability. At the start of each year, predicted LTG likelihood 
scores are grouped into quartiles and we form long-short hedge portfolios for each quartile 
based on average recommendations for each firm. Our analysis indicates that a trading 
strategy that follows the stock recommendations of analysts in our high LTG likelihood 
quartile earns average risk-adjusted returns of 2.9% per annum. Moreover, this forward-
looking, passive stock selection strategy beats passive indexing. Out-of-sample testing shows 
that a stock portfolio built using our algorithm, without rebalancing, earns abnormal returns 
of 2.5% per annum over the period 2006-2011. These results are consistent with LTG 
forecasts signalling greater analyst effort, which is reflected in the profitability of their stock 
recommendations. 
 This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Recent work by Jung et al. 
(2012) suggests that LTG forecasts are a signal of analyst effort. They find that the 3-day 
market reaction to stock recommendation revisions is significantly higher if they are 
                                                 
3 Cremers et al. (2009) use a logit regression to estimate the likelihood of becoming a takeover target in the 
next year. They then use the fitted values from the logit regression to sort firms into portfolios based on the 
likelihood of being a takeover target. An equal-weighted portfolio that buys firms with a high takeover 
likelihood and shorts firms with a low takeover likelihood generates a highly significant annualized abnormal 
return of 11.8%. 
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accompanied by LTG forecasts. The focus of their study, however, is not on whether 
investors can benefit from LTG forecasts in a longer term window. We find that information 
related to the issuance of LTG forecasts in the prior year is still relevant to the profitability of 
stock recommendations in the current year, which means investors have a longer period of 
time to accrue returns based on the information inherent in LTG forecasts and do not need to 
target their trading strategy just to take advantage of 3-day returns around the issuance of 
stock recommendations.  
Our results are also of interest to a practitioner audience, as we find that LTG 
forecast issuance is a parsimonious indicator of analyst effort, which encompasses other 
measures identified by prior studies, such as short-term earnings forecasting accuracy, 
experience and access to value relevant information. Furthermore, we show that a trading 
strategy based on LTG forecasts is superior to one based solely on short-term earnings 
forecasting ability. Finally, consistent with Herrmann et al. (2008), we find that Regulation 
FD has had an impact on analyst behaviour. Following Regulation FD, we find that the 
issuance of LTG forecasts is more strongly related to analyst ability, experience and access 
to value relevant information and is no longer related to potential conflicts of interest. This is 
reflected in a higher trading strategy return post-Regulation FD (3.7% versus 1.8% per 
annum).  
 
2. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development 
Prior studies examining the properties of analysts’ LTG forecasts find that they are 
optimistically biased, inaccurate and are negatively related to future excess returns. Dechow 
and Sloan (1997) and Rajan and Servaes (1999) were the first to document the optimistic 
bias in LTG forecasts. The size of the bias is reported by Harris (1999) as 7% higher than 
actual earnings growth. As further evidence, Chan et al. (2003) show that analysts forecast a 
 6 
16.4% higher LTG rate for firms in the top LTG quintile compared with firms in the bottom 
LTG quintile, even though the realized five-year growth rate only has a dispersion of 7.5%. 
To determine if analysts’ LTG forecasts contain valuable information about future firm 
performance a number of studies have related the magnitude of LTG forecasts to future stock 
returns. La Porta (1996) was the first to document a negative relationship between the 
magnitude of LTG forecasts and subsequent stock returns. He explains that analysts’ 
systematic mis-estimation of future LTG explains returns to contrarian strategies (i.e. stocks 
with low (high) analysts’ expectations of future LTG subsequently outperform 
(underperform) the market). This relationship has been further documented by Dechow and 
Sloan (1997), Dechow et al. (2000), Bradshaw (2004) and Barniv et al. (2009).  
 One proposed explanation for these findings is that because analysts are not generally 
evaluated on the accuracy of their LTG forecasts, they reflect analysts’ opportunistic 
incentives to stimulate investment banking business and generate trading commissions. Lin 
and McNichols (1998) and Dechow et al. (2000) show that analysts who are employed by 
the lead manager during an equity offering issue more optimistic LTG forecasts to attract 
and retain investment banking business. However, more recent papers by Ljungqvist et al. 
(2006) and Cowen et al. (2006) find no direct evidence that aggressive analyst behavior 
helps banks to attract investment banking business and suggest that analysts make a trade-off 
between career concerns and the incentive to generate new business. They find that more 
reputable analysts (i.e. All-Star ranking) and analysts at more prestigious banks (i.e. greater 
underwriting market share) have less upwardly biased forecasts, but that analysts’ forecasts 
appear to be more upwardly biased when the potential benefits are large and the potential 
cost to reputation is small. 
 In this paper we take a different approach by asking whether there is information 
inherent in the issuance (and not the magnitude) of LTG forecasts. We propose that LTG 
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forecasts are a signal of analyst effort - through the process of LTG forecasting analysts 
expend greater effort to understand the company and its future prospects (relative to analysts 
that don’t forecast LTG). Our approach is similar to that used in recent work by Call et al. 
(2013), who argue that when analysts forecast cash flows, they adopt a more structured 
approach to forecasting, which includes forecasting a full set of financial statements - 
income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement. They find that (i) analysts’ 
earnings forecasts issued together with cash flow forecasts are more accurate than those not 
accompanied by cash flow forecasts, and (ii) analysts’ earnings forecasts reflect a better 
understanding of the implications of current earnings for future earnings when they are 
accompanied by cash flow forecasts. 
 Our use of LTG issuance as a signal of analyst effort is also consistent with recent 
research by Jung et al. (2012), who find that stock recommendation revisions accompanied 
by LTG forecasts are associated with higher 3-day cumulative abnormal returns and that 
analysts that issue LTG forecasts have more favourable career outcomes. Their study, 
however, does not provide evidence that investors can benefit from LTG forecasts in a 
longer term window - the very definition of LTG forecasts.
4 Thus, the question of how 
investors should use analysts’ LTG forecasts remains largely unanswered.  
If LTG forecasts provide a signal of analyst effort, then the issuance of LTG forecasts 
should be related to analyst characteristics, identified by prior studies, which proxy for 
greater analyst effort (or higher analyst quality), e.g. short-term forecasting ability, analyst 
experience and access to private information (Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999; Barron et 
al., 2002). However, it is also possible that the issuance of LTG forecasts reflects analysts’ 
opportunistic incentives to stimulate investment banking business, generate trading 
                                                 
4 I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts (LTG) are generally considered to estimate the growth in earnings over a 
three to five-year period; I/B/E/S annualizes each individual analyst’s LTG forecast and converts it into a 
percentage (I/B/E/S 2000)  
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commissions and gain access to managers’ private information (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; 
Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dechow et al., 2000; Cowen et al., 2003). In addition, prior 
studies indicate that the issuance of analyst forecasts are related to analyst time constraints 
and resource availability (Mikhail et al. 1997, Clement 1999) and firm size, growth prospects 
and profit variability (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). As a result, we expect the issuance of 
LTG forecasts to be related to these analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics, as detailed 
by the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The issuance of analyst LTG forecasts is positively related to analysts’ short-term 
earnings forecasting accuracy, experience and access to value relevant information, 
brokerage conflicts of interest and resources, firm size, intangibles and growth 
potential; and is negatively related to analyst workload and earnings uncertainty.  
  
More importantly, if LTG forecasts are indeed a signal of analyst effort, this should 
also be reflected in the profitability of their stock recommendations. We undertake a trading 
strategy similar to Loh and Mian (2006) but with a number of important differences.
5
 First, 
we use information related to the issuance of LTG forecasts to distinguish between analysts 
rather than short-term earnings forecasting ability. Second, our trading strategy is based on 
inputs related to the prior year rather than the current year. We use the analyst, brokerage 
and firm characteristics we expect to be related to the issuance of LTG forecasts to predict 
the likelihood that an analyst will issue a future LTG forecast for a firm. The greater the 
                                                 
5 Rather than examining the stock recommendations of all analysts, Loh and Mian (2006) differentiate between 
analysts that have higher and lower short-term earnings forecasting ability. They find that a contemporaneous 
trading strategy following the stock recommendations of analysts in the highest forecasting accuracy quintile 
exceeds the return for analysts in the lowest quintile by 1.27% per month. Hall and Tacon (2010) examine this 
in a one-year ahead setting and find that while short-term earnings forecasting accuracy is persistent, 
differentiating between analysts using prior year short-term earnings forecasting ability results in insignificant 
trading strategy returns. 
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likelihood that an analyst issues a LTG forecast for a particular firm, the more likely that the 
analyst has exerted more effort to understand the company and its future prospects and the 
more likely trading on their recommendation produces abnormal returns. The following 
hypothesis details this expectation: 
 
H2: A higher likelihood of future LTG issuance is associated with more profitable stock 
recommendations.  
 In addition, as our sample spans the introduction of Regulation FD, we conduct our 
analysis using pre-Regulation FD and post-Regulation FD observations. Regulation FD was 
introduced in October 2000 by the Securities and Exchange Commission to prohibit firms 
from selectively disclosing information to analysts. The purpose of the regulation was to 
level the playing field by giving all market participants equal access to material information. 
It was also expected to reduce the incentive of analysts to produce optimistic forecasts to 
gain favours from management. Research examining the effect of Regulation FD on analyst 
behaviour has been mixed. Herrmann et al. (2008) finds that Regulation FD has reduced the 
incentive for analysts to provide optimistically biased forecasts. Srinidhi et al. (2009) find 
that Regulation FD has improved the quality of short-term earnings forecasts but reduced the 
quality of LTG forecasts. Other studies document that analyst earnings forecast accuracy has 
decreased and dispersion has increased following the introduction of Regulation FD (Bailey 
et al., 2003; Agrawal et al., 2006).  
In this study we expect Regulation FD to have an impact on LTG issuance in a 
number of ways. First, Regulation FD is expected to reduce the incentives of analysts to 
produce LTG forecasts specifically to gain favour with management. Second, as Regulation 
FD has limited analysts’ access to private information from management, the importance of 
analyst ability, experience and access to other private information is expected to be 
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enhanced. Together these expectations suggest that LTG forecasts will be an even clearer 
indicator of analyst effort post-Regulation FD, which should be reflected in higher trading 
strategy returns. The following hypothesis focuses on the expected effects of Regulation FD: 
 
H3: Following the introduction of Regulation FD, (i) analysts’ incentives to produce LTG to 
gain favour with management are reduced, (ii) the importance of analyst ability, 
experience and access to other value relevant information are enhanced, and (iii) 
trading strategy returns are higher. 
 
3. Data and sample description 
Initially, all U.S. firms with analysts’ long-term earnings growth forecasts (i.e. annualized 
earnings growth forecasts over a 5 year horizon) are identified from the I/B/E/S Detail 
History Files (I/B/E/S) for the period of January 1994 through December 2005.
6 
In total, 
there are 157,512 unique analyst-firm-year observations, 9,982 unique firms and 7,660 
unique analysts who made at least one LTG forecast over the sample period. We impose 
several filters on the data: (i) we exclude repeat observations - multiple LTG forecasts by the 
same analyst for the same firm in the same year
7
; (ii) we require that each firm is followed 
by at least four analysts in a given year and at least one analyst provides a LTG forecast
8
; 
and (iii) we exclude observations that don’t have sufficient data to compute all independent 
variables in the logit model, as well as the returns tests. These restrictions result in a total 
                                                 
6 Coverage of LTG data in I/B/E/S began in 1982. However, prior to the early 1990s, LTG forecast dates 
recorded by I/B/E/S differ from the actual forecast date (Cooper et al., 2001). Also, for our trading strategy we 
need access to stock recommendation data which is not available on I/B/E/S prior to 1994.  
7 If an analyst issues multiple LTG forecasts for the same firm in the same year, this is only counted as one 
analyst-firm-year observation. 
8 At the analyst level, a total of 13,385 analysts provide earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S during the sample period, 
of which 57% issued at least one LTG forecast. The average number of analysts issuing a one-year-ahead 
earnings forecast for a given firm is seven, whereas the average number of analysts issuing a LTG forecast is 
three. At the firm level, earnings forecasts were provided to I/B/E/S for 13,778 firms during the sample period. 
Of these, LTG forecasts were issued for 72% of firms. 
 11 
analyst-firm-year sample of 50,989 made by 5,061 unique analysts for 4,370 unique firms. 
We gather financial statement data from Compustat for our logit model. One-year-ahead 
earnings forecast data and stock recommendations are also collected from I/B/E/S.  
 Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for one-year-ahead cumulative and 
abnormal returns for the full sample. Across all analysts, one-year-ahead mean and median 
cumulative abnormal returns are insignificantly negative, consistent with the findings of La 
Porta (1996).
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the analyst, brokerage and 
firm characteristics we use in our logit model. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix and discussed in the next section. The measures are partitioned on whether 
analysts issue a LTG forecast for a given firm in a given year. LTG forecast percentages for 
the full sample are consistent with prior research, which documents that, on average, 
analysts’ LTG forecasts are fairly optimistic (Bradshaw, 2004, Dechow et al., 2000). The far 
right column shows the p-values of mean t-tests (on top) and Wilcoxon tests (on bottom) of 
the differences between the two groups.  
The results confirm our expectations that the likelihood of issuing LTG forecasts is a 
function of analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics. In particular, analysts are more likely 
to issue LTG forecasts if they have greater forecasting ability (ABILITY), more experience 
(EXP) and access to value relevant information (VALUE), suggesting that the production of 
LTG forecasts is positively related to analyst effort. Also, analysts that follow fewer 
companies (NCOS) and industries (NSICS) and work for larger brokerage firms (BSIZE) are 
more likely to issue LTG forecasts, suggesting that issuance of LTG forecasts is negatively 
related to time and effort constraints and positively related to resources available. At the 
analyst-brokerage level, the analyst incentive variable (AFFIL) indicates that analysts are 
more likely to issue LTG forecasts if the brokerage they are affiliated with also conducts 
underwriting business, suggesting potential conflicts of interest when providing LTG 
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forecasts. The results also indicate that analysts are more likely to issue LTG forecasts for 
firms that are bigger (MV), have more intangible assets (INTAN) and less volatile earnings 
(EVOL). Finally, the result for the market-to-book ratio (M/B) is not significant, suggesting 
that the likelihood of issuing a LTG forecast is not necessarily related to firm’s growth 
opportunities.  
Panel C of Table 1 displays the distribution of stock recommendations by analyst 
type, regulation environment and market movements over the sample period. Out of all stock 
recommendations, 34% (17,307/50,989) are accompanied or preceded by a LTG forecast 
published by the same analyst in the calendar year. On average, recommendations with LTG 
forecasts are more favourable than those without LTG forecasts, but the median of both 
groups is a “Buy” recommendation. Panel C also reports that before Regulation FD took 
effect, stock recommendations accompanied by LTG forecasts were on average more bullish 
than recommendations not accompanied by LTG forecasts, particularly in rising markets.
9
  
Table 2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman 
correlation coefficients below the diagonal for all variables used in our analysis. The 
correlations are consistent with the results in Table 1 regarding our expected relationships 
between LTG forecast issuance and analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics.  
 
4. Empirical analysis and results 
In this section, we first describe and demonstrate our logit model approach to predict the 
likelihood of future LTG forecast issuance by analysts. We then describe our trading strategy 
and the benchmark portfolios that we use to evaluate our trading strategy.  
                                                 
9 To make interpretation of the results more intuitive, we invert the standard I/B/E/S coding of 
recommendations to be 1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Sell, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy and 5 = Strong Buy. This permits the more 
natural interpretation that a higher recommendation suggests possible undervaluation and a buy signal (see, for 
example, Bradshaw, 2004) 
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4.1 Likelihood of LTG issuance 
The likelihood that an analyst will issue a LTG forecast for a firm in the next year is 
estimated by a logit regression. In the model the dependent variable is a “LTG forecast 
likelihood dummy” which takes the value of 1 if analyst i issues a LTG forecast for firm j in 
year t. Since our test concerns the probability of an analyst issuing LTG in the next year, we 
incorporate a number of lagged independent variables that we expect are related to the 
issuance of LTG forecasts.  
If LTG forecasts provide a signal of analyst effort, then the issuance of LTG forecasts 
should be related to analyst characteristics, identified by prior studies, which proxy for 
greater analyst effort (or higher analyst quality), such as short-term earnings forecasting 
ability, analyst experience and access to private information. Consistent with Clement (1999) 
we measure analyst forecasting ability (ABILITY) as the mean absolute forecast error of 
each analyst’s short-term earnings forecasts across all companies they forecast each year. 
Mean absolute forecast error is calculated as the negative of the analyst’s absolute forecast 
error minus the average absolute forecast error of all analysts covering the firm divided by 
the average absolute forecast error of all analysts covering the firm. We calculate analyst 
experience (EXP) as the number of years for which an analyst has supplied at least one 
earnings forecast to I/B/E/S (Mikhail et al., 1997).
10
 We measure access to value relevant 
information (VALUE) following Barron et al. (2002), who separate the information in 
analysts forecasts into common and private (i.e. value relevant) components. Value relevant 
information is calculated as  where SE is the squared error of the 
                                                 
10 We also use firm specific experience instead of overall experience with consistent results. We cannot include 
both of these variables in the same model due to a high correlation (0.65) between them.  

s  D
[(11/N)D SE]2
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consensus mean forecast (EPSactual – EPSconsensus)
2 
, D is the dispersion among the forecasts  
and N is the number of analysts making forecasts.
11
 
Following Clement (1999), we also relate LTG issuance to the number of companies 
that an analyst follows (NCOS) and the complexity of each analyst’s portfolio (NSICS). 
Analysts that follow more companies and forecast across more industries are expected to 
have less time to devote to LTG forecasts. At the brokerage level, prior studies indicate that 
analysts may issue LTG forecasts in order to establish and maintain other business 
relationships with firms (e.g. Lin and McNichols, 1998). To measure analysts’ incentives 
(AFFIL), we utilise the Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation index to identify if the 
brokerage the analyst is affiliated with also conducts other business (e.g. underwriting).
12
 
Based on Michaely and Womack (1999), we also relate LTG issuance to brokerage firm size 
(BSIZE), which proxies for the resources available to analysts. Analysts that have more 
resources are expected to issue more forecasts, including LTG forecasts.  
At the firm level, previous research suggests that demand for analyst research 
increases with firm size, growth opportunities and intangible assets (Lang and Lundholm, 
1996). Larger firms generally have greater investor following and hence a greater demand 
for analyst coverage. We measure firm size (MV) as the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity. Since growth stocks generally experience higher trading volume, the 
likelihood of analysts providing LTG forecasts for growth firms is higher (Cowen et al., 
2006). We use the market-to-book ratio (M/B) as a measure of growth. As intangible assets 
are not capitalized under US-GAAP, they are hard for investors to interpret and create a 
greater demand for analyst coverage (Barth et al., 2001). We measure intangibles (INTAN) 
                                                 
11 While this is a firm-level variable we use it to distinguish between analysts that follow firms that have more 
or less access to value relevant information imbedded in their earnings forecasts. We assume that analysts that 
consistently follow firms that have more private information in their earnings forecasts possess more value 
relevant information.  
12 This is a general measure of whether the brokerage conducts other business, not a specific measure of 
whether the brokerage conducts other business with specific firms. We thank Jay Ritter for making the 
modified Carter-Manaster ranks available on his website.  
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as the book value of intangible assets divided by total assets. In addition, Dichev and Tang 
(2009) indicate that analysts find it difficult to forecast firms with higher earnings volatility. 
We measure earnings volatility (EVOL) as the natural logarithm of the coefficient of 
variation of the earnings/price ratio over the past 10 years (minimum 5 annual observations).  
 Our logit model is detailed below and includes year dummy variables and industry 
dummy variables classified according to Fama and French (1997).  
 
tjitjitji
tjitjitjitjitji
tjitjitjitjitji
IndustryYearEVOLINTAN
BMMVBSIZENSICSNCOS
AFFILVALUEEXPABILITYlogitLTGProb
,,1,,111,,10
1,,91,,81,,71,,61,,5
1,,41,,31,,21,,10,,
/
(][









 (1) 
  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results for our pooled logit analysis. We find positive 
coefficients on analyst ability (ABILITY), analyst experience (EXP) and value relevant 
information (VALUE). This indicates that analysts that are more accurate at forecasting 
short-term earnings, analysts that have more forecasting experience and analysts that have 
more access to value relevant information are more likely to issue LTG forecasts. This is 
consistent with our expectations, as these variables are expected to be related to analyst 
effort. However, we also find a positive coefficient on our analyst incentive variable 
(AFFIL), which indicates that analysts affiliated with a brokerage that also provides 
underwriting services are more likely to issue LTG forecasts. This suggests that analysts in 
these brokerages have more of an incentive to produce LTG forecasts in order to establish 
and maintain other business relationships with firms.
13
 While this result is consistent with 
prior studies, it has a potential negative effect on our use of LTG issuance as an indicator of 
analyst effort.  
                                                 
13 This finding is qualified by the same endogeneity problem as prior studies (e.g. Dechow et al., 2000) as it 
does not explore causation between LTG forecasts and underwriting contracts. 
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The coefficients on the other variables are consistent with expectations. Positive 
relationships are found between the issuance of LTG forecasts and brokerage size, firm size 
and intangible assets. Negative relationships are found between the issuance of LTG 
forecasts and the number of companies followed, analyst portfolio complexity and earnings 
volatility. No significant relationship is found between LTG forecast issuance and market-to-
book ratios. 
 Table 3 Panel A also presents sensitivity estimates for each independent variable. The 
sensitivity estimate provides the change in the probability that an analyst issues a LTG 
forecast for a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable with the other 
independent variables held constant at their means.
14
 For example, a one-standard-deviation 
change in analyst ability (ABILITY) increases the likelihood than an analyst will issue a 
LTG forecast for a given firm in a given year by 34.8%.  
Panel B of Table 3 controls for possible overstatement of the pooled regression 
results in Panel A. To control for time-series dependence among the residuals we run the 
regression on an annual basis and compare the frequencies of the significance of the 
independent variables across the sample period. The last row of Panel B counts the number 
of years in which each variable is significant at p<1%. The annual cross-sectional logit 
model’s coefficients are stable over time. Thus, we can use the estimated coefficients to sort 
analysts into portfolios based on the likelihood they issue LTG forecasts in the next year. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The model-implied probability that an analyst will issue a LTG forecast for a given firm in a given year is 
given by the following equation:  where i represents the coefficient for 
independent variable i and xijt represents the value of the independent variable for observation j in time t. 
Probabilityi, j,t =
exp(a + bixi, j,y )
i=1
n
å
1+ exp(a + bixi, j,y )
i=1
n
å
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4.2 Portfolio formation and trading strategy   
In the next empirical step, we use the estimated coefficients from the annual logit regressions 
to calculate the predicted likelihood of a LTG forecast in the following year (LTG likelihood 
score), which is then used to sort firms into quartile portfolios (for a similar approach, see 
Cremers et al., 2009 and Wahlen and Wieland, 2011). Our trading strategy involves 
calculating the returns from trading on the recommendations in each quartile portfolio. 
Specifically our methodology is as follows. 
Before the first trading day in year t we sort analyst-firm-year observations into four 
portfolios based on our “LTG likelihood score”, which is based on analyst, brokerage and 
firm characteristics in year t-1. The “LTG likelihood score” is the fitted value of the logit 
regression per analyst-firm-year observation at the end of year t-1. The fitted value of the 
logit regression ranges from 0 to 1 and increases with the likelihood of future LTG issuance. 
It is important to note that any of the analyst or firm characteristic measures alone do not 
dictate the portfolio that an analyst is assigned to. We then rank analyst-firm-years into 
quartiles based on the following percentile score intervals: [0, 0.25], (0.25, 0.5], (0.5, 0.75], 
and (0.75, 1]. “LTG likelihood scores” falling in the [0.75-1] percentile build the highest 
LTG likelihood portfolio (L1).15 Given that the “LTG likelihood” score distinguishes the 
probability of an analyst issuing a LTG forecast for a particular firm in the future, we now 
turn to the key question of the paper: Can investors use our “LTG likelihood” score to pick 
long-term winners and losers that will outperform a passive investment strategy?  
For the four portfolios we calculate average recommendations for each stock 
followed by the analysts in each portfolio. Our portfolios are long stocks in which the 
consensus recommendation is favourable and short stocks in which the recommendation is 
                                                 
15 The average “LTG likelihood score” per analyst-firm observation in the first (L1) and fourth (L4) portfolios 
are 0.81 and 0.14, respectively. These are averages across time and across all analyst-firm observations in the 
respective portfolios, without any scaling.  
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unfavourable. Due to the skewed distribution of analysts’ recommendations, stocks are 
included in the favourable (long) portfolio when their average recommendation is greater 
than or equal to four (i.e. a buy recommendation or better). Stocks are included in the 
unfavourable (short) portfolio if the average recommendation is less than or equal to 3.5 (i.e. 
between a hold and underperform or worse). We exclude all stocks with an average rating 
that is greater than 3.5 but less than 4. Recommendations are used until they are 
reiterated/revised or become stale (i.e. maximum life of 6 months). This portfolio formation 
process is conducted prior to the first trading day in year t and the portfolio is only 
rebalanced when changes in average firm recommendations, caused by the exclusion of stale 
recommendations or the issuance of new recommendations, moves a firm in or out of the 
favourable (long) or unfavourable (short) portfolios.
16
 Portfolio value-weighted returns are 
then calculated at the end of each trading day and compounded to monthly returns. The 
returns to these portfolios are adjusted for four risk factors: the market factor, the size and 
book-to-market factors proposed by Fama and French (1993), as well as the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the performance across LTG likelihood score portfolios. 
Recall that our trading strategy is to form zero-investment portfolios in which we are long 
(short) stocks with consensus favourable (unfavourable) recommendations. The second 
column contains descriptive statistics on unadjusted monthly returns for the long-short 
portfolios. The third to fifth columns provide abnormal returns based on CAPM, Fama-
French and four-factor asset pricing models. Portfolio L1, consisting of analyst-firm-years 
with the highest likelihood of LTG forecasts, produces significant 4-factor adjusted 
abnormal returns of 0.24% per month (compounded to 2.9% per annum). In unreported 
                                                 
16 This portfolio rebalancing approach is different to Loh and Mian (2006) and other researchers and is 
designed to minimize the need to frequently rebalance the investment portfolios. Other researchers rebalance 
their portfolios on a daily basis which will incur much higher transaction costs and is contrary to the idea of 
long-term investing.  
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results, the return on the long portfolio is 0.19% per month and the return on the short 
portfolio is -0.05% per month. In contrast, portfolio L4 consisting of analyst-firm-years with 
the lowest likelihood of LTG forecasts, earns four-factor adjusted returns of -0.15% per 
month (-1.8% per annum). The difference between the long-short portfolio returns for the 
high LTG likelihood and low LTG likelihood portfolios (L1-L4) is 0.39% per month (4.8% 
per annum). Results for the CAPM and Fama French models are consistent with the 4-factor 
models.  
Overall, these results show that there is a strong link between the likelihood of LTG 
issuance and stock recommendation profitability. This confirms our expectation that LTG 
issuance is an indicator of analyst effort, which flows through to the profitability of their 
stock recommendations. However, we remind the reader that as per previous studies, these 
returns exclude transaction costs (which have been minimized in our trading strategy 
approach).  
 Since Loh and Mian (2006) and Ertimur et al. (2007) document a link between short-
term earnings forecasting ability and the profitability of analysts’ stock recommendations, it 
is possible that our results are driven by an association between LTG forecast issuance and 
short-term earnings forecasting ability. To overcome this concern we complete two 
additional tests, which are presented in Panels B and C of Table 4. First, we repeat our 
analysis using analysts’ short-term earnings forecast accuracy in the prior year, rather than 
the LTG likelihood score, as the differentiator and evaluate the profitability of stock 
recommendations in the current year. Consistent with prior studies, short-term earnings 
forecasting accuracy is calculated as the mean absolute forecast error of each analyst’s short-
term earnings forecasts across all companies they forecast each year.
17
 In Panel B, we 
present the results for the highest and lowest short-term earnings forecast accuracy quartiles. 
                                                 
17 See the Appendix for a detailed definition of short-term earnings forecasting accuracy.  
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We note that abnormal returns are close to zero in all models. This finding is similar to that 
of Hall and Tacon (2010) and confirms that past short-term earnings forecast accuracy alone 
is not a good predictor of the future profitability of stock recommendations.  
 Second, in the highest quartile of short-term earnings forecasting ability, we split the 
observations into quartiles based on the likelihood of LTG issuance and compare the 
profitability of trading strategies following the highest and lowest likelihood of LTG 
issuance. This determines whether the LTG likelihood score has an incremental effect on the 
profitability of a trading strategy based on short-term earnings forecast accuracy. Panel C 
presents these results and shows that within the quartile of analysts with the highest short-
term earnings forecast accuracy, the long-short 4-factor adjusted abnormal return for the high 
LTG likelihood portfolio is 0.21% per month compared to -0.09% per month for the low 
LTG likelihood portfolio.
18
 In summary, these results show that differentiating between 
analysts based on LTG likelihood produces a profitable forward-looking trading strategy that 
is superior to differentiating between analysts based solely on short-term earnings 
forecasting ability.  
In addition, to clearly demonstrate that LTG forecast issuance is a signal of analyst 
effort to gain a value-relevant perspective of the long-term prospects of the firms they 
follow, we compare the profitability of the recommendations of actual LTG issuers versus 
non-issuers. In Panel D, we distinguish between analysts that did and didn’t issue LTG 
forecasts in year t-1 and examine the profitability of trading on their stock recommendations 
in year t. This trading strategy is implementable and does not suffer from look-ahead bias. 
For the long-short portfolios displayed in Panel D, we find that the LTG issuer portfolio 
provides 4-factor adjusted abnormal returns of 0.18% per month. For analysts who don’t 
issue LTG forecasts, the return is insignificant at -0.04% per month. The difference between 
                                                 
18 In this quartile, high likelihood LTG analysts comprise 8,312 analyst-firm-year observations and low 
likelihood LTG analysts comprise 6,988 analyst-firm-year observations.  
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the long-short portfolio returns for the LTG issuer and the LTG non-issuer portfolios is 
0.22% per month. These results confirm that LTG forecasts are a persistent signal of analyst 
effort, which provide investors with an indicator of which analysts issue more profitable 
stock recommendations the year after LTG issuance.   
Furthermore, since our logit estimation uses information for the same period used for 
sorting stocks into portfolios and calculating abnormal returns, a vital robustness test is to 
confirm our results using out-of-sample testing. Thus, we take our LTG likelihood score at 
the end of 2005 to sort firms into out-of-sample portfolios, which we hold from the 
beginning of 2006 until the end of 2011. These out-of-sample results are documented in 
Panel E of Table 4. The average abnormal returns from our long-short high LTG likelihood 
portfolio, with no rebalancing over the period are 0.21% per month (2.5% per annum). As 
another benchmark, this long-short high LTG likelihood portfolio built using our algorithm 
outperformed the market index (S&P500) on average by 0.28% per month (3.4% per annum) 
over the period 2006-2011. These results indicate that investors can pick stocks by using our 
forward-looking LTG likelihood score and earn abnormal returns that beat passive investing. 
  
5. The Effect of Regulation FD and Market Movements 
As our sample spans the introduction of Regulation FD, we repeat our analysis using pre-
Regulation FD (1994 to 2000) and post-Regulation FD (2001 to 2005) observations. We 
expect Regulation FD to have an impact on LTG issuance in two ways. First, Regulation FD 
is expected to reduce the incentives of analysts to produce LTG forecasts specifically to gain 
favour with management. Second, as Regulation FD has limited analysts’ access to private 
information from management, the importance of analyst ability, experience and access to 
other value relevant information is expected to be enhanced. Together these expectations 
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suggest that LTG forecasts will be an even clearer indicator of analyst effort post-Regulation 
FD, which should be reflected in higher trading strategy returns.  
 To test our expectations we re-estimate equation (1) by interacting all of the 
independent variables with a dummy variable, which takes the value of one in the Post-
Regulation FD period (2001 – 2005). In this revised equation, the coefficients on the original 
variables (e.g. ABILITY, EXP, etc) represent the relationships in the Pre-Regulation FD 
period. The coefficients on the interaction terms (e.g. ABILITY*Post-FD dummy, etc) 
represent the difference between the relationships in the Post-Regulation FD period versus 
the Pre-Regulation FD period. The sum of the two coefficients for each variable (e.g. 
ABILITY plus ABILITY*Post-FD dummy, etc) represent the relationships in the Post-
Regulation FD period. For convenience, we report all coefficients in the same panel as Pre-
Reg FD, Post-Reg FD and Post vs. Pre.  
Table 5 Panel A presents our analysis of the likelihood of LTG forecast issuance in 
the pre-Regulation FD and post-Regulation FD periods, and the difference between the 
periods. The coefficients on analyst ability (ABILITY), analyst experience (EXP) and value 
relevant information (VALUE) are positive across the two periods. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the coefficients on these variables are all significantly higher following the 
introduction of Regulation FD. The coefficient on the analyst incentive variable (AFFIL) is 
positive pre-Regulation FD and insignificant post-Regulation FD. The difference between 
the coefficients is negative and significant at the 1% level. There are also some differences in 
the other variables with the relationships between LTG issuance and analyst workload 
(NCOS), portfolio complexity (NSICS) and firm size (MV) becoming more positive after 
Regulation FD. The relationship between LTG issuance and volatility (EVOL) becomes 
more negative after Regulation FD. There are no significant changes for brokerage size 
(BSIZE), intangibles (INTAN) and firm growth (M/B).   
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These results indicate that Regulation FD has had a material effect on the incentive of 
analysts to issue LTG forecasts to establish and maintain other business relationships with 
firms. Post-Regulation FD, analysts affiliated with brokerages that also provide underwriting 
services are no more likely to issue LTG forecasts than other analysts. In addition, we find 
that analyst ability, experience and private information are better predictors of LTG issuance 
post-Regulation FD. This is consistent with Srinidhi et al. (2009) who find that LTG is 
harder for analysts to forecast post-Regulation FD, as analyst’s access to private information 
from management is diminished.  
To confirm these results we undertake two robustness checks. First, while we 
attribute these changes to the effect of Regulation FD, we acknowledge that other changes 
following Regulation FD, such as NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472 and the Global 
Research Analysts Settlement, may have also contributed to these documented effects (see 
Barniv et al., 2009).
19
 To investigate this possibility, we return to Table 3 and note that the 
greatest impact on the relationship between LTG issuance and our analyst incentive variable 
(AFFIL) occurs in the years immediately after the introduction of Regulation FD (2001 and 
2002). Second, our results could also be due to differences in market conditions between the 
pre- and post-Regulation FD periods.
20
 To control for the impact of market performance on 
our results, we repeat our analysis described above using only periods of rising markets 
(1995-1999 and 2003-2005) or falling markets (2000-2002). Table 5 Panel B shows that the 
results for Post vs. Pre differences are consistent for our specific variables of interest 
(ABILITY, EXP, VALUE and AFFIL) in both rising and falling markets. Results for other 
variables are also generally consistent (the only exceptions being MV and INTAN). 
                                                 
19 These subsequent regulations became effective in April and July 2003. 
20 Our 11 year sample period also covers extreme movements in the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ indices: (i) 1995-
1999 when cumulative average returns were an annualised +27 per cent and every calendar year was a positive 
return, (ii) 2000-2002 when cumulative average returns were an annualised –15 per cent and every calendar 
year was a negative return, and (iii) 2003-2005 when cumulative average returns were an annualised +17 per 
cent and every calendar year was a positive return. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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Therefore, we believe these results justify our statement that the effects are due to Regulation 
FD.  
We also examine if these changes around the introduction of Regulation FD affect 
the profitability of our trading strategy. If LTG forecast issuance is a clearer indicator of 
analyst effort post-Regulation FD then our trading strategy returns should be higher. Table 6 
presents the results of this analysis. Unadjusted monthly returns and intercepts from CAPM, 
Fama-French and 4-factor models are provided. Column (9) provides differences between 
the Post vs. Pre periods. In Panel A, we find the 4-factor adjusted abnormal return in the 
long-short high LTG likelihood portfolio (L1) is 0.30% per month (3.7% per annum) post-
Regulation FD compared to 0.15% per month (1.8% per annum) pre-Regulation FD. Another 
way to interpret these results is that the difference in returns between the high LTG 
likelihood and low LTG likelihood portfolios was on average 0.35% per month (4.3% per 
annum) pre-Regulation FD. In the post-Regulation FD period this difference increases to an 
average of 0.51% per month (6.3% per annum). In conjunction with our prior results, this 
shows that Regulation FD has had an impact on analyst behavior and LTG forecasts are an 
even clearer indicator of analyst effort post-Regulation FD. 
To ensure these results are also not driven by market movements, we repeat our 
analysis using only periods of rising markets (1995-1999 and 2003-2005) or falling markets 
(2000-2002).
21
 Panels B and C of Table 6 present these results. In rising markets (Panel B), 
the 4-factor adjusted abnormal return in the high LTG likelihood portfolio (L1) is 0.32% per 
month (3.9% per annum) post-Regulation FD compared to 0.16% per month (1.9% per 
annum) pre-Regulation FD. In falling markets (Panel C), the 4-factor adjusted abnormal 
return in the high LTG likelihood portfolio (L1) is 0.27% per month (3.3% per annum) post-
                                                 
21 Market movements shouldn’t cause return differences since the abnormal returns already control for market 
returns. To the extent that the 4-factor model does not adequately control for the impact of regulatory changes 
on market returns, however, Regulation FD is a plausible reason for the return differences.  
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Regulation FD compared to 0.14% per month (1.7% per annum) pre-Regulation FD. A 
summary of these results is presented in Figure 1.  
 
 
6. Additional Analysis 
We conduct a number of additional checks to ensure the validity of our results. A frequent 
concern in the analyst literature is that research on analyst outputs is vulnerable to the issue 
of researchers not being able to observe these outputs if analysts choose not to report them to 
I/B/E/S (see Defond and Hung, 2003). To ensure the results of this study are not biased by 
the forecasts reported to I/B/E/S, we conduct two checks. First we manually examine the 
content of a random sample of 50 analysts’ research reports found on the Investext database 
for LTG-related information (Bradshaw, 2002; Demirakos et al., 2004). We find that 
analysts that do not provide LTG data to I/B/E/S also have no LTG data in their research 
reports. Second, we reverse engineer LTG forecasts from price-to-earnings-to-LTG (PEG) 
ratios for non-LTG forecasters in our sample.
22
 We find that non-LTG forecasting analysts 
have an implied LTG rate that is 6.1% higher than LTG forecasting analysts. The difference 
between the means of the two analyst groups is statistically significant. Therefore, we are 
confident that analysts that provide LTG forecasts to the I/B/E/S database are analysts that 
have exerted more effort in examining the future prospects of firms. 
Also, in this paper we propose that LTG forecasts are an indicator of analyst effort. 
Another potential explanation is that analysts only issue LTG forecasts for certain types of 
firms, e.g. those with better future prospects. In our analysis we have been careful to limit 
                                                 
22 The PEG ratio is equal to the price-to-earnings ratio divided by LTG. Hence, the PEG ratio can be rearranged 
to solve for LTG, i.e. LTG=P/E/PEG. We collect for all non-LTG forecasting analysts target price data from 
First Call, P, and substitute for E the one-year-ahead earnings forecast data made in the month of the target 
price. The mean (median) reverse-engineered LTG forecast for non-LTG forecasters is 25.0% (17.3%), relative 
to mean (median) LTG forecasts of 18.9% (15.0%) for LTG forecasters. The difference between the means of 
the two groups is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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differences in firm characteristics across investment portfolios. In our sample, we require 
firms to be followed by at least four analysts in a given year, with at least one analyst 
providing a LTG forecast. This effectively limits our sample to all firms with at least one 
LTG forecast and excludes firms that do not receive LTG forecasts. We also check to see if 
similar firms are represented in different LTG likelihood portfolios and find that 81.6% of 
sample firms are represented at least once in the high (L1) and low (L4) LTG likelihood 
portfolios. Only 5.1% (3.4%) of firms are only ever in the high (low) LTG likelihood 
portfolios. Therefore, we are confident that differences in firm characteristics have a minimal 
effect on our trading strategy results. Furthermore, if we remove our sample restrictions and 
include all firms with the necessary data to be included in our analysis (i.e., include more 
variation in firm characteristics), our results are even more striking. The long-short high 
LTG likelihood portfolio produces abnormal returns of 0.69% per month (8.6% per annum) 
over the period 1995 to 2005.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Prior research has provided scant evidence that analyst LTG forecasts contain useful 
information for investors. In this study we investigate LTG forecasts as a signal of analyst 
effort. We predict that through the process of LTG forecasting analysts expend greater effort 
to understand the company and its future prospects (relative to analysts that don’t forecast 
LTG), which should be reflected in the profitability of their stock recommendations. We 
investigate analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics that are related to LTG forecast 
issuance and whether it is possible for investors to earn abnormal returns by trading on the 
signal imbedded in LTG forecast issuance. In particular, we develop a “LTG likelihood 
score” that summarizes analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics and serves as a signal of 
the likelihood of a LTG forecast in the next year. We find that a forward-looking trading 
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strategy that follows analyst recommendations in our high LTG likelihood portfolio earns 
significant four-factor adjusted abnormal returns of 2.9% per annum. Furthermore, these 
results are even higher following Regulation FD (3.7% per annum) and are consistent in out-
of-sample testing without portfolio rebalancing (2.5% per annum). 
 For investors, our results indicate that LTG forecasts do contain valuable information, 
but the information is in the issuance of the forecast rather than the magnitude of the 
forecast. Thus, in contrast to prior research that concludes that analysts’ LTG forecasts are 
“biased and inaccurate” and therefore not useful inputs in investment decisions, we show 
that LTG forecasts are useful, but must be “used with caution”. We propose that long-term 
investors looking to achieve abnormal returns should focus their attention on the more 
informative stock recommendations provided by analysts that issue long-term growth 
forecasts.  
 Finally, while our results provide evidence that LTG forecasts are a signal of analyst 
effort, an underlying question still remains unaddressed. Why don’t all analysts issue LTG 
forecasts? We acknowledge that it is not costly for analysts that perhaps do not produce their 
own LTG forecasts to issue a LTG forecast based on consensus estimates. But, analysts are 
not doing this. This suggests that analysts themselves are perhaps not currently aware of the 
signal imbedded in LTG forecast issuance. Future research should continue to investigate 
LTG issuance to see if analyst behaviour remains the same or changes in response to the 
findings of Jung et al. (2012) and this paper.  
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
 
LTGF 
dummy variable set to one if the analyst issues a long-term earnings growth forecast for 
firm i in year t and zero otherwise. 
ABILITY measures analyst’s ability, proxied by analyst short-term earnings forecast accuracy, 
calculated as absolute one-year-ahead earnings forecast error: AFEijt =|Actualjt – 
Forecastijt|
  
where AFEijt is analyst i’s absolute forecast error for firm j in year t, Actualjt is 
the actual earnings per share for firm j in year t, and Forecast ijt is the most recent forecast 
issued by analyst i prior the 30th June in year t. The measure is adjusted for differences in 
information environments across firms following Clement (1999): MAFEijt= [(AFEijt- 
Avg(AFEit))/Avg(AFEit]*-1 where Avg(AFEit) is the average absolute error of all analysts 
covering the firm. We multiply MAFEijt by -1 to ensure that higher values of it correspond 
to higher earnings forecast accuracy. 
EXP is a measure of analyst’s general experience, calculated as the number of years for which 
analyst i supplied at least one forecast during year t. 
VALUE is a measure of the precision of idiosyncratic information, s, and measures the extent to 
which analysts rely on private or value relevant information; calculated as follows 
 where SE is the squared error of the consensus mean forecast 
(EPSactual – EPSconsensus)
2 , D is the dispersion among the forecasts (STDEV2 where STDEV 
is the standard deviation of  I/B/E/S estimates) and N is the number of analysts making 
forecasts. We use one-year-ahead earnings forecasts made on the day of the first annual 
earnings announcement on Compustat and maximum 29 days thereafter 
NCOS is a measure of analyst workload, calculated as the number of firms for which analyst i 
supplied at least one forecast during year t. 
NSICS is a measure of analyst portfolio complexity, calculated as the number of 4-digit SIC 
industry groups for which analyst i supplied at least one forecast during year t. 
AFFIL is a measure of analyst conflict of interest, calculated as a dummy variable set to 1 if 
analyst i works for a brokerage that has Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation index 
greater than zero, and set to 0 if analyst i works for a brokerage that has no Carter-
Manaster index. 
BSIZE is a measure of analyst resources, calculated as the number of analysts that work for the 
brokerage house analyst i works for during the year t. 
MV is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity prior to the year of the 
analyst’s long-term growth forecast (Compustat#25*24) 
M/B  is the market-to-book ratio for firm i in year t-1 (Compustat#24#25/t#60) 
INTAN  is the firm’s book value of balance sheet intangibles (including goodwill), scaled by total 
assets, prior to the year of the analyst’s LTG (Compustat #33/#6). 
EVOL is the natural logarithm of the earnings volatility of the firm measured as the coefficient of 
variation of the firm’s earnings/price (E/P ratio), which is calculated as [standard deviation 
of E/P / mean of E/P]. E/P is defined as earning per share before extraordinary items scaled 
by beginning stock price. The coefficient of variation of the firm’s E/P ratio uses 
information prior to the year the long-term EPS growth forecast is issued and is based on a 
minimum (maximum) of 5 (10) annual E/P observations. 
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Figure 1 
Annualized long-short abnormal trading strategy returns pre- and post-Regulation FD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.8% 1.9% 1.7% 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable n Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Q1 Q3 t-test p 
Wilcoxon p 
Panel A: Buy and hold returns 
CR  50,989 1.61 1.69 1.25 0.11 3.41  
AR  50,989 -0.09 -0.13 0.74 -0.53 0.33  
 
Panel B: Analyst, brokerage and firm characteristics 
LTG forecasts         
Full sample 50,989 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.03 2.56  
Long portfolio 24,704 0.23 0.22 0.13 0.05 2.88 0.00 
Short portfolio 26,285 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.00 1.89 0.00 
ABILITY         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 0.05 0.05 0.47 -0.07 0.36 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 0.02 0.02 0.32 -0.08 0.18 0.00 
EXP         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 4.93 4.00 2.59 2.00 7.00 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 4.01 3.00 2.71 2.00 6.00 0.00 
VALUE         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.97 0.01 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.01 0.94 0.00 
NCOS        
with LTG forecasts 17,307 17.55 14.00 12.36 11.00 21.00 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 19.02 16.00 15.23 11.00 23.00 0.00 
NSICS         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 5.15 5.00 3.32 3.00 7.00 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 5.49 5.00 4.05 3.00 7.00 0.00 
AFFIL         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 0.38 0 0.44 0 1 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 0.24 0 0.43 0 0 0.00 
BSIZE         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 66.31 48.0 65.0 22.0 88.0 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 47.93 29.0 56.0 10.0 63.0 0.00 
MV         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 7.69 7.57 1.87 6.30 8.88 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 7.42 7.40 1.90 6.11 8.70 0.00 
M/B         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 3.95 2.60 29.68 1.67 4.37 0.91 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 3.89 2.32 60.45 1.52 3.83 0.85 
INTAN         
with LTG forecasts 17,307 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.20 0.03 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.04 
EVOL        
with LTG forecasts 17,307 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.00 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 0.98 1.01 0.13 0.17 1.22 0.00 
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Variable n Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Q1 Q3 t-test p 
Wilcoxon p 
Panel C: Characteristics of stock recommendations 
with LTG forecasts 17,307 3.81 4.00 1.19 3.00 5.00 0.05 
without LTG forecasts 33,682 3.78 4.00 1.22 3.00 5.00 0.12 
         
Pre-Regulation FD         
- Rising market          
with LTG forecasts 9,477 3.94 4.00 1.19 3.00 5.00 0.01 
without LTG forecasts 10,534 3.84 4.00 1.22 3.00 5.00 0.09 
- Falling market         
with LTG forecasts 1,503 3.76 4.00 1.24 3.00 5.00 0.12 
without LTG forecasts 1,727 3.70 4.00 1.33 3.00 5.00 0.21 
         
Post-Regulation FD         
- Rising market         
with LTG forecasts 11,459 3.78 4.00 1.20 3.00 5.00 0.32 
without LTG forecasts 12,334 3.77 4.00 1.24 3.00 5.00 0.45 
- Falling market         
with LTG forecasts 1,890 3.71 4.00 1.19 3.00 5.00 0.10 
without LTG forecasts 2,065 3.66 4.00 1.22 3.00 5.00 0.26 
         
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of LTG forecast-recommendation combinations 
issued over the 1994–2005 period by analysts that meet our sample selection criteria. Panel A reports 
cumulative returns (CR) for the one year holding period beginning on the first trading day of the new 
calendar year and ending on the last trading day in that year. Abnormal returns (AR) are four-factor 
adjusted abnormal returns. Panel B reports analyst, brokerage and firm variables partitioned on whether 
the analyst issues a LTG forecast for a given firm in a given year. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
t-tests are for the null hypothesis that the mean difference between observations with and without LTG 
forecasts is zero. Wilcoxon tests are for the null hypothesis that the median difference between 
observations with and without LTG forecasts is zero. Data is from I/B/E/S, CRSP and Compustat. Panel C 
shows analyst stock recommendations by analyst type and different sample period breakdowns. Pre-
Regulation FD covers the period 1994-2000. Post-Regulation FD covers the period 2001-2005. Rising 
markets covers the periods 1994-1999 and 2003-2005. Falling markets covers the period 2000-2002. 
Analysts’ stock recommendations are from I/B/E/S. 
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Table 2 
Correlation coefficients 
 
Variable LTGF ABILITY EXP VALUE NCOS NSICS AFFIL BSIZE MV M/B INTAN EVOL 
LTGF 
 
0.059 0.026 0.018 -0.055 -0.042 0.023 0.117 0.034 0.002 0.065 -0.032 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.00) (0.05) 
ABILITY 0.054 
 
0.010 0.008 -0.019 -0.026 0.017 0.038 0.018 0.005 0.010 -0.008 
(0.00) (0.08) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) (0.10) (0.09) 
EXP 0.021 0.008 
 
-0.019 0.048 0.032 0.060 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.109 0.009 
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.28) 
VALUE 0.020 0.004 -0.016 
 
0.002 -0.019 0.061 0.201 0.141 0.200 0.05 0.005 
(0.00) (0.55) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.07) 
NCOS -0.051 -0.010 0.168 0.001  0.442 -0.041 -0.063 -0.023 0.010 -0.119 0.028 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.94)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) 
NSICS -0.027 -0.019 0.038 -0.018 0.398  -0.019 -0.109 -0.128 0.002 0.042 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.57) 
AFFIL 0.020 0.013 0.052 0.070 0.040 -0.031 
 
0.077 0.047 -0.019 0.018 -0.017 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.11) 
BSIZE 0.162 0.040 0.200 -0.01 0.031 -0.129 0.081 
 
0.138 0.006 0.017 0.004 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.27) 
MV 0.031 0.014 0.102 0.010 -0.022 -0.147 0.042 0.160 
 
0.029 0.041 0.113 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) 
M/B 0.007 0.001 -0.02 0.010 0.016 0.020 -0.018 0.020 0.037 
 
0.009 0.006 
(0.80) (0.80) (0.00) (0.03) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) 
INTAN 0.060 0.010 0.130 0.00 -0.142 0.106 0.017 0.090 0.119 0.008 
 
0.109 
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
EVOL -0.030 -0.011 0.008 0.008 0.050 0.022 -0.020 0.004 0.00 0.009 0.017 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.19) (0.05) (0.00) (0.33) (0.12) (0.37) (0.46) (0.89) (0.04) 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below the diagonal. P-values are shown in 
parentheses under the correlations. Data is from I/B/E/S, Compustat and CRSP, and includes 50,989 analyst-firm-years between 1994 and 2005. 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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This table provides results from estimating equation (1) for analysts who did and did not issue a LTG forecast for firm i in year t. All independent 
variables are lagged. Panel A reports under the heading “All Years” the estimated coefficients of the logit model over the entire sample period, 1994-2005. 
The “sensitivity” estimates provide the change in the probability of issuing a LTG forecast for a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable 
with the other variables held constant at their means. Panel B reports the results of the logit model for each year individually over the sample period, with 
the last row counting the number of significant coefficient estimates at the 1% level. Variables are defined in the Appendix. The logit models also include 
year and industry dummies, which are not reported. Asterisks indicate significance from zero at the 1% level ***, 5% level ** and 10% level *. 
 
 
  
Table 3  
Logit analysis of the likelihood of long-term growth forecast issuance 
   
Year Intercept ABILITY EXP VALUE NCOS  NSICS  AFFIL  BSIZE EVOL MV M/B INTAN 
Predicted sign + + + - - + + - + + + 
Panel A: Coefficients and probabilities from pooled logit regression 
All Years -0.330*** 0.093*** 0.035*** 0.045*** -0.041*** -0.026*** 0.252*** 0.004*** -0.929*** 0.023*** 0.002 0.527*** 
Sensitivity  0.348*** 0.221*** 0.244*** -0.171*** -0.093*** 0.504*** 0.009*** -1.006** 0.014*** 0.004 0.847** 
Panel B: Coefficients from annual logit regressions 
1994 -1.163*** 0.015*** 0.001 0.036*** -0.005* -0.014 0.369*** 0.015*** -0.900 0.041*** 0.032* 0.406* 
1995 -1.464*** 0.059* 0.005 0.068*** -0.007*** -0.003 0.182*** 0.015*** -0.112*** 0.012*** 0.010 0.980*** 
1996 -0.724*** 0.097*** 0.053*** 0.029*** -0.008*** -0.015*** 0.297*** 0.007*** -0.902*** 0.013*** 0.000 0.771*** 
1997 -1.037*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.060* -0.018*** -0.027*** 0.105*** 0.007*** -0.801*** 0.035*** 0.011*** 0.643*** 
1998 -0.975*** 0.105*** 0.012*** 0.055*** -0.009*** -0.014*** 0.551*** 0.006*** -0.081*** 0.050*** 0.001 0.320*** 
1999 -1.228*** 0.064*** 0.016*** 0.066*** -0.033*** -0.058*** 0.666*** 0.006*** -0.780*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 1.155*** 
2000 -1.272*** 0.016*** 0.031* 0.032*** -0.015*** -0.023*** 0.329*** 0.005*** -0.102*** 0.018*** 0.010* 0.341* 
2001 -1.110*** 0.153*** 0.041*** 0.019 -0.005*** -0.016*** 0.199 0.002*** -0.501** 0.054* 0.003 0.132* 
2002 -0.795*** 0.085*** 0.021*** 0.010*** -0.002*** -0.011*** 0.103 0.021*** -1.001*** 0.002*** 0.047 0.991*** 
2003 -1.116*** 0.078*** 0.121*** 0.098*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.198*** 0.013*** -0.404* 0.052*** 0.030 0.726*** 
2004 -0.853*** 0.177*** 0.051*** 0.025*** -0.047*** -0.023*** 0.258*** 0.003*** -0.074*** 0.080*** 0.101 0.419*** 
2005 -1.094*** 0.184*** 0.071*** 0.027*** -0.011*** -0.039*** 0.127*** 0.006*** -0.106* 0.042*** 0.002* 1.023*** 
# years p < 
1% 12 11 9 10 11 10 10 12 8 11 2 9 
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Table 4  
Comparison of returns and coefficient estimates earned by portfolios constructed on LTG issuance likelihood  
 Unadjusted Monthly Portfolio Return  Intercept (%) 
Issuance rank Long-short CAPM  Fama-French 4-factor 
Panel A: Portfolios formed based on “LTG likelihood” score 
L1 (High) 1.71 0.30 0.27 0.24 
 (3.23)*** (3.30)*** (3.24)*** (3.20)*** 
L2 1.69 0.21 0.09 0.11 
 (3.11)*** (1.54) (1.65) (1.63) 
L3 1.71 0.02 0.03 0.01 
 (2.07)** (0.13) (0.12) (0.1) 
L4 (Low) 1.47 -0.25 -0.20 -0.15 
 (2.03)** (2.98)*** (3.01)*** (2.87)*** 
L1–L4 0.24 0.55 0.47 0.39 
 (2.98)*** (2.78)*** (2.70)*** (2.48)*** 
Panel B: Portfolios formed based on short-term forecast accuracy 
L1 (High) 1.61 0.03 0.12 0.07 
 (2.14)** (1.30)  (1.24)  (0.82)  
L4 (Low) 1.49 -0.22 -0.17 -0.14 
 (1.84)  (1.52)  (1.01)  (1.17)  
L1–L4 0.12 0.25 0.29 0.21 
 (1.16)  (1.39)  (0.98)  (1.09)  
Panel C: Portfolios formed based on “LTG likelihood” score in the quartile with the highest short-term forecast accuracy 
L1 (High) 1.74 0.30 0.24 0.21 
 (3.23)*** (2.61)*** (2.54)*** (2.11)*** 
L4 (Low) 1.47 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 
 (2.23)*** (-1.97)** (1.96)** (1.95)* 
L1–L4 0.27 0.42 0.34 0.30 
 (2.98)*** (2.36)*** (2.13)*** (2.02)** 
Panel D: Portfolios formed based on LTG issuers vs. non-issuers by prior year long-term growth issuance 
LTG issuer 1.70 0.20 0.19 0.18 
 (3.01)*** (2.80)*** (2.64)*** (2.51)*** 
LTG non-issuer 1.51 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 
 (3.00)*** (1.90)* (1.83)** (1.57) 
LTG issuer –  0.19 0.27 0.25 0.22 
LTG non-issuer (3.43)*** (2.49)*** (2.38)*** (2.24)** 
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Panel E: Out of sample: Portfolios formed based on “LTG likelihood” score in 2005 and held 2006-2011 
L1 (High) 1.68 0.28 0.24 0.21 
 (3.11)*** (2.44)*** (2.29)*** (2.20)*** 
L4 (Low) 1.45 -0.15 -0.13 -0.08 
 (2.85)*** (-2.30)** (2.25)** (2.01)*** 
L1–L4 0.23 0.43 0.37 0.29 
 (3.03)*** (2.36)*** (2.19)*** (2.04)** 
 
This table reports summary statistics for market-adjusted monthly returns and intercept estimates for asset pricing models. Panel A compares portfolios 
with the highest likelihood (L1), moderate likelihood (L2 and L3) and lowest likelihood (L4) of LTG forecast issuance. At the beginning of year t, we 
form value-weighted portfolios from the consensus firm recommendation of analyst-firm-year observations placed into quartiles based on their “LTG 
likelihood” score at the end of the prior year t-1. Our portfolios are long stocks in which the consensus firm recommendation in the quartile is favourable 
and short stocks in which the consensus firm recommendation in the quartile is unfavourable. In the last row, L1-L4, we are long in L1 and short in L4. In 
Panel B, the comparison is based on quartile ranks in analyst short-term forecast accuracy relative to all analysts following the same firm each year. Only 
the highest and lowest accuracy quartiles are reported. Panel C reports results for portfolios formed by LTG likelihood in the most accurate short-term 
earnings forecaster quartile. Panel D reports results for portfolios formed for analysts who did and didn’t issue LTG forecasts in the prior year. Panel E 
reports out-of-sample results for the period 2006-2011. We use the LTG likelihood” score at the end of 2005 to form portfolios and hold these portfolios 
until the end of 2011. t-statistics are provided below each coefficient in parentheses. The returns to these portfolios are adjusted for four risk factors: the 
market factor, the size and book-to-market factors proposed by Fama and French (1993), as well as the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. Asterisks 
indicate significance from zero at the 1% level ***, 5% level ** and 10% level *. 
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This table provides results from estimating equation (1) for analysts who did and did not issue a LTG forecast for firm i in year t for different sample 
periods. All independent variables are lagged. Panel A reports results for the Pre-Regulation FD (1994–2000) and Post-Regulation FD (2001–2005) 
periods, with an interaction term reporting the difference between coefficients (Post vs. Pre). Panels B and C report results in different sub-periods 
representing different market movements. Rising markets covers the periods 1994-1999 and 2003-2005. Falling markets covers the period 2000-2002. 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. The logit models also include year and industry dummies, which are not reported. Asterisks indicate significance 
from zero at the 1% level ***, 5% level ** and 10% level *. 
Table 5  
Long-term growth forecast likelihood in pre- and post-Regulation FD periods and market movements 
   
Year Intercept ABILITY EXP VALUE NCOS NSICS AFFIL  BSIZE EVOL MV M/B INTAN 
Predicted sign + + + - - + + - + + + 
Panel A: Coefficients from pooled logit regressions Pre- and Post-Regulation FD 
Pre-Reg FD -0.184*** 0.034** 0.021** 0.034** -0.012** -0.040* 0.504*** 0.006*** -0.227* 0.014*** 0.016* 0.841** 
Post-Reg FD -0.329*** 0.147*** 0.092*** 0.091*** -0.007*** -0.025*** 0.188* 0.004*** -0.472*** 0.051*** 0.059 0.658*** 
Post vs. Pre -0.145** 0.113*** 0.071*** 0.057** 0.005* 0.015* -0.346** -0.002 -0.245*** 0.037** 0.043 -0.183 
Panel B:  Coefficients from pooled logit regressions Pre- and Post-Regulation FD in rising and falling markets 
Rising Markets (1994-1999 & 2003-2005)          
Pre-Reg FD -0.599*** 0.042** 0.011* 0.036** -0.015** -0.044** 0.369*** 0.015*** -0.137* 0.024*** 0.032* 0.801** 
Post-Reg FD -0.464*** 0.121*** 0.084** 0.068** -0.010*** -0.035*** 0.182*** 0.013*** -0.331*** 0.069*** 0.010 0.980*** 
Post vs. Pre 0.135*** 0.079*** 0.073** 0.032** 0.005** 0.009* -0.187*** -0.002 -0.194*** 0.045*** -0.022* -0.179* 
Falling Markets (2000-2002)          
Pre-Reg FD -1.290*** 0.016*** 0.031* 0.032*** -0.015*** -0.023*** 0.329*** 0.005*** -0.102*** 0.018*** 0.010* 0.341* 
Post-Reg FD -1.083*** 0.091** 0.068** 0.051*** -0.002** -0.013*** 0.176** 0.002*** -1.041*** 0.012*** 0.025 0.550** 
Post vs. Pre 0.207*** 0.075** 0.037* 0.019** 0.013** 0.010* -0.153** -0.003 -0.939*** -0.006*** 0.15 0.209* 
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Table 6         
Portfolio returns pre- and post-Regulation FD and market movements 
 
      
Unadjusted Monthly 
Portfolio Return  
Pre-Regulation FD                           
Intercept (%) 
  Unadjusted Monthly 
Portfolio Return  
Post-Regulation FD                           
Intercept (%) 
  Post 
vs. 
Pre Long-short CAPM  Fama-French 4-factor  Long-short CAPM  Fama-French 4-factor  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9 = [8-4]) 
Panel A: Entire Sample Period (1995-2005)     
    
L1           1.61 0.20 0.18 0.15  1.81 0.34 0.31 0.30  0.15  
(2.96)*** (2.33)*** (2.25)*** (2.21)***  (3.18)*** (3.00)*** (2.44)*** (2.32)***  (2.20)***  
L4           1.33 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20  1.47 -0.25 -0.24 -0.21  -0.01  
(2.44)*** (2.28)*** (2.11)*** (2.17)***  (2.66)*** (2.98)*** (3.01)*** (2.87)***  (1.89)*  
L1–L4    0.28 0.43 0.40 0.35  0.44 0.59 0.55 0.51  0.16  
(3.08)*** (2.84)*** (2.74)*** (2.55)***  (3.14)*** (2.88)*** (2.64)*** (2.40)***  (2.01)**  
Panel B: Rising Markets (1995-1999 & 2003-2005)        
L1            2.41 0.21 0.20 0.16  2.63 0.32 0.31 0.32  0.16  
(2.96)*** (2.38)*** (2.19)*** (2.24)***  (3.18)*** (3.00)*** (2.44)*** (2.32)***  (2.44)***  
L4            2.24 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18  2.37 -0.26 -0.20 -0.19  -0.01  
(2.44)*** (2.41)*** (2.20)*** (2.09)**  (2.66)*** (3.11)*** (3.14)*** (2.99)***  (1.80)  
L1-L4      0.17 0.42 0.39 0.34  0.26 0.58 0.51 0.51  0.17  
(2.12)** (2.98)*** (2.83)*** (2.62)***  (2.84)*** (3.04)*** (3.00)*** (2.58)***  (2.21)**  
Panel C: Falling Markets (2000-2002)     
    
L1            0.61 0.18 0.18 0.14  1.11 0.30 0.28 0.27  0.13  
(0.96) (2.03)** (2.09)** (1.99)**  (1.18) (3.00)*** (2.60)*** (2.41)***  (2.10)***  
L4           1.33 -0.25 -0.26 -0.28  1.05 -0.30 -0.28 -0.25  0.03  
(1.44)  (3.00)*** (2.91)*** (2.67)***  (1.66)  (2.98)*** (2.84)*** (2.53)***  (2.03)*  
L1-L4     -0.72 0.43 0.44 0.32  0.06 0.60 0.56 0.52  0.16  
(1.08)  (2.38)*** (2.42)*** (2.39)***  (1.22)  (2.75)*** (2.59)*** (2.33)***  (1.99)**  
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This table reports intercepts (alphas) from four-factor asset pricing models for long-short portfolios for high LTG likelihood (L1) and low LTG likelihood (L4) 
portfolios. Pre-Regulation FD covers the period 1994-2000. Post-Regulation FD covers the period 2001-2005. Panels B and C report results in different sub-periods 
representing different market movements. Rising markets covers the periods 1994-1999 and 2003-2005. Falling markets covers the period 2000-2002. At the 
beginning of year t, we form value-weighted portfolios from the consensus firm recommendation of analyst-firm-year observations placed into quartiles based on 
their “LTG likelihood” score at the end of the prior year t-1. Our portfolios are long stocks in which the consensus firm recommendation in the quartile is favourable 
and short stocks in which the consensus firm recommendation in the quartile is unfavourable. t-statistics are provided below each coefficient in parentheses. The 
returns to these portfolios are adjusted for four risk factors: the market factor, the size and book-to-market factors proposed by Fama and French (1993), as well as 
the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. Asterisks indicate significance from zero at the 1% level ***, 5% level ** and 10% level *. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
